In this paper we consider an oligopoly and we are concerned with the effect of entry in the market of buyers and/or sellers on the price of the good being sold and the pay-offs/utilities of the buyers and sellers. The major results obtained in this paper are the following: 1) Given the number of buyers both individual as well as aggregate offers go up as the number of sellers increases. Further, the price of Y decreases, each buyer is better off and each seller is worse off as the number of sellers increases. 2) Given the number of sellers, the price of Y increases, each buyer is worse off and each seller is better off as the number of buyers increases. 3) As the economy is replicated the equilibrium price decreases. The sequence of equilibrium prices thus obtained converges to the competitive equilibrium price of the original economy. 4) As the economy is replicated the buyers are better off. The sequence of consumption bundles of the buyers converges to the consumption bundle of the buyers at the competitive equilibrium of the original economy. 5) As the economy is replicated the sellers are worse off. The sequence of consumption bundles of the sellers converges to the consumption bundle of the sellers at the competitive equilibrium of the original economy.
Introduction
We consider a general equilibrium model with two goods, i.e. money (X) and an infinitely divisible good (Y), where buyers are initially endowed only with X and sellers are initially endowed only with Y. Unlike the perfectly competitive model we assume that sellers behave strategically. However where buyers are concerned, they may or may not behave strategically. If buyers also behave strategically then we have a simple version of a strategic market game due to Shubik [1] , Shapley [2] and Shapley and Shubik [3] that is discussed in Gabszewicz and Michel [4] . The latter class of models has been studied in [5] . If they act as price-takers then the pure exchange economy becomes a version of Counot's model of oligopoly. Such models have been discussed in [6] .
In this paper we consider an oligopoly and we are concerned with the effect of entry in the market of buyers and/or sellers on the price of Y and the payoffs/utilities of the buyers and sellers. An increase in the number of buyers leads to an increase in the availability of X as also an increase in the demand for Y; an increase in the number of sellers leads to an increase in the availability of Y as also an increase in the demand for X. Hence our paper is concerned with comparative statics in oligopolistic markets. Amir and Bloch [7] discuss these issues in a very general model for bilateral oligopolies. We discuss similar issues for an oligopoly assuming that buyers and sellers have Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Hence whereas our buyers are price takers in the Cournotian tradition, in the kind of bilateral oligopoly that Amir and Bloch [7] deal with, buyers behave strategically and submit bids against the offers that sellers place at the trading post. Thus the two market structures are entirely different. Further our use of Cobb-Douglas utility functions allows us to obtain sharper results than what Amir and Bloch [7] do, albeit in a different market structure. The analysis in Amir and Bloch [7] "focuses on three questions: When does an increase in the number of buyers result in an increase in the total bids on the market? In an increase in the equilibrium price of the private good? In an increase in the equilibrium utility of the sellers?" We address all the above questions and obtain definite answers for the same; in addition we show that entry of new buyers lead to a decline in the utility of existing buyer. We also obtain definite answers for the ef-fect of the entry of sellers on the total and individual offers, the price of Y and the utility of both buyers and sellers. Our model is somewhat more general than the pioneering version due to Codognato and Gabszewicz [6] .
While we do state results for the asymptotic convergence of prices and allocations when we keep replicating the economy, these results are along the lines established in [8] or [9] . Such price-allocation pairs converge to the unique competitive equilibrium of the non-replicated original economy as should have been anticipated. However, the monotonic behavior of prices, consumption bundles and utilities that we observe under both onesided entry as well as with replication of the economy is something that is beyond the scope of the general framework in which the asymptotic analysis is carried out. In particular we are able to go beyond the questions addressed in earlier investigations for bilateral oligopoly and claim that buyers are unconditionally better off and sellers are unconditionally worse off as the economy is replicated. This result may not be true for a bilateral oligopoly.
The assumption that all utility functions are CobbDouglas is in the present context hardly a serious limitation of the paper. First Cobb-Douglas or log-linear utility functions are very common (if not mandatory) in applied general equilibrium analysis. While the functional form is specific there is considerable flexibility in the choice of the parameter which determines the exact utility function. Second a lot of deep results in general equilibrium theory (to the extent of proving that the competitive mechanism is uniquely informationally efficient) has been possible only in the case of Cobb-Douglas utility functions. Third using Cobb-Douglas utility functions for buyers is a theoretically desirable variant of using linear demand functions on which most of industrial organization is based. Downward sloping linear demand functions are generated by quasi-linear utility functions whose non-linear part is a concave quadratic function. Fourth Cobb-Douglas utility functions are the only utility functions to be characterized by the empirically relevant property that the fraction (and not the amount) of total expenditure allocated to a good is independent of prices and expenditure. Finally, the use of Cobb-Douglas utility functions rather than an arbitrary one makes the analysis in this paper accessible to a much larger audience than would be possible otherwise. Thus it can be expected that the comparative static results that we obtain in this paper will throw some light on the behavior of oligopolistic markets in the setting of pure exchange.
It is worth noting that unlike monopolistic competition, the product sold in an oligopoly is homogeneous and identical across sellers. Hence for all practical purposes, the assumption that all sellers have the same preferences and all buyers have the same preferences is also not a major limitation of the model. It just makes the analysis simpler without sacrificing any major implication.
The Model
Following Amir and Bloch [1] we consider an economy with two goods i.e. money (X) and another non-monetary divisible commodity (Y). The economy has two types of traders: buyers each of whom own one unit of X, and sellers each of whom are endowed with one unit of Y. 
Oligopoly Equilibrium
Hence the solution to maximize
in the proof of lemma 1, it follows that it has a solution in (0,1).
Consider the equation ( ) ( ) Let us denote the solution to the above quadratic by ( ) Let Q denote the aggregate offers at the oligopoly equilibrium. Then s q Q n = for all 1, , Since the price of Y increases if 'n' remains fixed and 'm' increases whatever is available now was also available earlier to any buyer who was in the market before 'm' increased. Hence any such buyer is worse off with increase in 'm'. If 'n' remains fixed and 'm' increases then there is no change in the consumption of Y by a seller; however his consumption of X goes up and so he is better off. 
Conclusions
While for bilateral oligopoly there are several studies dealing with comparative statics, such is not the case for the kind of (asymmetric) oligopoly that we deal with here. It is true that there is a large literature concerned with oligopoly when the sellers are profit maximizing producers. However when the sellers are traders (as in the case of large fixed cost industries with minimal variable costs, like crude oil) there is very little investigation beyond what has been discussed in [6] . The study of such markets has been the objective of this paper.
The major results obtained in this paper are the following:
1) Given the number of buyers both individual as well as aggregate offers go up as the number of sellers increases. Further, the price of Y decreases, each buyer is better off and each seller is worse off as the number of sellers increases. 2) Given the number of sellers, the price of Y increases, each buyer is worse off and each seller is better off as the number of buyers increases. 3) As the economy is replicated the equilibrium price decreases. The sequence of equilibrium prices thus obtained converges to the competitive equilibrium price of the original economy. 4) As the economy is replicated the buyers are better off. The sequence of consumption bundles of the buyers converges to the consumption bundle of the buyers at the competitive equilibrium of the original economy. 5) As the economy is replicated the sellers are worse off. The sequence of consumption bundles of the sellers converges to the consumption bundle of the sellers at the competitive equilibrium of the original economy. The results that we obtain are thus along expected lines in a market economy and economic theory tells us that such phenomena is generally observable under perfect competition. Here we see that these same results are observable under oligopoly as well. This leads us to conclude that simply by observing the behavior of markets and the related entry-exit dynamics we cannot decide that a market is perfectly competitive. In fact the presence of a few sellers and a finite number of buyers points to the greater likelihood of the underlying market structure being oligopolistic.
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